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1. Introduction 
　Recently, the difficultly of continuous company growth through only 
conventional managements skills and resources has increased. As a result, 
surviving drastic environmental changes, such as globalization, has 
also become challenging. Thus, developing international strategies is an 
essential requirement for new companies. Business management resources, 
such as speedy business judgment, owned advanced technologies, or 
expertise, that sustain strategic globalization are consequently required. 
However, companies’ business management resources have natural limits, 
requiring them to obtain resources they do not possess from other parties 
instead. Hence, since the 1980s, strategic alliances and international 
joint ventures (IJVs), such as complementation, have been the focus for 
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sustaining business management resources.
　International business studies, such as Stopford and Wells (1972), 
have suggested that IJVs are one effective investment form in foreign 
markets. Multi-national companies (MNCs) face difficulties on entering 
foreign markets because their resources in relation to local markets—
such as market knowledge and local operation capability—are limited. 
Such resources can be obtained if IJVs are arranged with local companies. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of time and expense, developing such 
technologies, when they are unavailable, becomes arduous. Conversely, 
sourcing necessary technologies from partners saves both expenses 
and time. Thus, the establishment of IJVs helps complement business 
management resources.
　Additionally, companies may have to apply for legal regulations against 
foreign investment in the local market. They may also have to find a local 
partner who will assist license acquisitions. Foreign companies often 
encounter license or incentive acquisition difficulties in such markets. 
Without local connections, they would have to independently establish 
necessary distribution channels. However, if their local partner already 
has related resources, they can access them through IJVs. Aside from the 
business management or technology resources related to the local market, 
they must also consider investment risks arising from establishing the IJV. 
However, it may ease and disperse possible risks, thus motivating MNCs.
　However, the joint management of IJVs also has negative aspects. 
An IJV is operated by two more companies with different backgrounds. 
Conflicts related to profits, management policies, and miscommunication, 
among other issues, may be easily caused, compared to wholly owned 
subsidiary (WOSs). Such conflicts may trigger dissolution or withdrawal of 
IJVs. Furthermore, IJVs generally have poor longevity too. In the Trojan 
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horse hypothesis, with respect to a Japanese and Western collaboration, 
numerous researchers find that IJVs have shorter lifespans. When an 
IJV is established, the extent to which each partner owns the partnership 
becomes an important factor. Particularly, ownership depends on how much 
investment ratio each partner obtains, and each partner will want to occupy 
more investment ratio in order to gain more benefits out of the IJV. Such 
negotiation is processed based on gentility, though it remains a difficult 
process for each partner. Like a waterfowl paddling, while the visible upper 
body seems elegant, the waterfowl paddles at full power under water. We 
presume that the investment ratio when they enter into the market, and its 
variation, may influence IJV relationships, the positioning of each partner, 
and so on after a while. More importantly, we presume that the investment 
rate at the first stage may affect the longevity and continuity of IJVs.
　Previous studies on Japanese joint venture behavior mainly focused 
on collaboration with Western partners, but rarely on collaboration 
with non-Western partners. In IJVs between Japanese and Western 
firms, the two firms are often competitors. They compete to acquire their 
partner’s knowledge. Thus, short-term oriented partnership behavior 
was emphasized because of such inter-partner competitive relationships. 
Therefore, we must explore Japanese joint venture behavior in 
collaboration with the firms of developing countries. Since operating local 
businesses requires foreign capital, such ventures are generally important 
investment options for Japanese firms.
　Due to Thailand’s increasing importance in Japanese investments, 
we focus on Japanese joint ventures there. Thailand is a representative 
country among the ASEAN countries, which have been recognized for 
their remarkable economic growth over the last few decades. In addition, 
Thailand has been recognized as a special market for China-plus-one 
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among ASEAN countries. Its business infrastructure is organized relatively 
efficiently. Furthermore, Japanese firms have functioned in its market 
since the 1960s (For example, Thailand has become a critical market for 
the sales and production of Japanese automobile makers).
　We also show the results of our pilot study that analyzed ownership 
changes of Japanese manufacturing in joint ventures since 1987. We used 
data from Kaigai-Shinshutsu-Kigyo-Soran (Japanese Multinationals, Facts 
and Figures) published by Toyo-Keizai-Shinpo-Sha for this purpose.
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Fragility and continuity of IJVs 
　THH studies, such as Ishii (2009), have suggested that IJVs are 
generally more fragile than wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) in terms 
of continuity. Unquestionably, it is understandable that IJVs managed 
jointly by individual partners have less longevity than WOS. As mentioned, 
IJVs tends to have lower longevity. Since IJVs management is always 
accompanied by adjustment of interests and occurrence of conflicts, IJVs 
have fragile continuity.
　Juhn (2000) also noted that IJVs have less longevity compared to WOS 
by a Japanese company. Often, IJVs also dissolved earlier than their 
parent company expected. The research by Juhn (2000) was related to IJVs 
organized by Japanese and Korean companies. Furthermore, the research 
indicated that 45.2% of the IJVs that entered Korea in 1969 withdrew from 
the market by 1997. Hennart and Zeng (2002) noted that IJVs organized 
by parent companies from different countries tended to encounter larger 
conflicts, and thus, their continuity was also shorter. As indicated, the 
features of the ownership allocated by IJVs’ parent companies may cause 
conflicts. Moreover, it could lead to dissolution of the IJV. In addition, when 
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complementary relationship and mutual profit between parent companies 
are not maintained, it becomes difficult for the parent companies to 
continue the IJV. Harrigan (1998) and Hennart and Zeng (2002) noted 
in their research on international businesses that IJV had less longevity 
compared to other forms of organization.
　Previous studies, such as Reich and Mankin (1986) and Hamel (1991), 
suggested that Japanese firms tended to terminate joint ventures with 
Western firms. They argued that such short-term oriented partnerships 
are caused by the Japanese firms’ motive to acquire knowledge of foreign 
market and technology from their Western joint venture partners. Japanese 
firms also ended joint ventures shortly after effectively and efficiently 
learning from their Western partners. This short-term Trojan Horse-
oriented partnership behavior exhibited by Japanese firms was also tested 
in Ishii (2009) and Ishii and Hennart (2010).
　However, previous studies on Japanese joint venture behavior mainly 
focused on collaboration with Western partners; they rarely dealt with 
non-Western partners. In IJVs between Japanese and Western firms, the 
two firms are often competitors; they compete to acquire their partner’s 
knowledge. Due to this inter-partner competitive relationship, short-term 
oriented partnership behavior was emphasized more. However, we must 
explore Japanese joint venture behavior with respect to collaboration 
with developing countries. Generally, such Japanese joint ventures with 
local firms in developing countries are important investment options for 
Japanese firms because operating local businesses requires foreign capital.
2.2 Investment rate of IJVs 
　Muramatsu (1991) noted that investments by parent companies into 
IJV mean that the parents companies possess their ownership of the IJV. 
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Therefore, the parent company tends to gain more investing ratio than 
the foreign partner in order to maintain the IJV initiative. Encarnation 
(1999) pointed out that the logic for majority ownership and undisputed 
control is often compelling; MNCs create and sustain a competitive 
advantage through the skillful management of tangible and intangible 
assets in technology, marketing, and organization. Likewise, maintaining 
their status as major investment holders can be advantageous for utilizing 
IJV assets. Therefore, this leads to increased tendency of claiming more 
investing ratio than foreign partners.
　Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) noted that mortality risk averages about 
40% at 5% equity levels (i.e., overseas subsidiaries with 5% foreign equity 
levels have 40% probability of exit in a year, controlling for all other 
effects). This value drops steeply to 12% when the main Japanese parent 
owns around 50% equity. Beyond this level, the drop-in mortality is more 
gradual, stabilizing at approximately 8% mortality risk when the main 
Japanese parent retains an equity level of 80% and above.
　Juhn (2000) noted that equity level held by the Japanese parent company 
did not influence IJVs’ longevity. In fact, human factors, such as presence 
of Japanese expatriate employees at the IJV, may strongly influence it. The 
study also noted that, in Japanese-Korean IJVs, the maintenance factor of 
IJVs drops drastically during five to 10 years after the establishment of the 
IJVs. This indicated that mortality risk is the highest between five and 10 
years after the IJV was established.
　As mentioned, the period between five and 10 years after the IJV is 
established is the most critical period for it. In our review of literature 
on investment rates, we find descriptions of different views. However, in 
“Japanese and Western companies” and “Japanese and Asian companies” 
combinations, we must consider different factors relevant to each type. 
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As indicated earlier, “Japanese and Western companies” often tend to be 
competitors. On the other hand, with “Japanese and Asian companies,” 
most Japanese companies are in a position that allows them to transfer 
their technologies to local companies. Thus, it is important to note that the 
objectives and positions of IJVs differ based on their conditions.
3. Overview of IJVs in Thailand 
　We herewith provide an overview of Japanese IJVs with Thai companies 
in Thailand as of 2015. We used IJV data from the Kaigai-Shinshutsu-
Kigyo-Soran (Japanese Multinationals, Facts and Figures) 2016 edition. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, the total number of IJVs is 559. We categorized them 
into Sales, Chemical, Service, Machine, Metal, Food, Textile, Electronics, 
Finance, Automobile, and Others to see any features. We find the most IJVs 
in Sales (112 IJVs), followed by Chemical (110IJVs) and Service (84IJVs). 
The automobile category only contained one IJV, though most Japanese 
automobile companies had already entered the Thai market in early 1960s. 
Reviewing for reference, two IJVs were established in 1950 that still exist; 
the most number of IJVs that still exist in the Thai market is 204, and they 
entered in 1990s.
Figure 3.1 Japanese IJVs in Thailand (2015)
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　Figure 3.2 indicates the number of partners in the IJV—two companies 
or more than three companies for each category. The categories are the 
same as Figure 3.1. The highest rate of IJV with two partners is Chemical 
with 44%. The highest rate of IJV with three or more partners is Finance 
with 90%, followed by Metal and Service with 70% each. Overall, the 
number of IJVs with three or more partners exceeds those with only one 
or two partners. As mentioned earlier, we did not refer as Automobile data 
was limited to only one type.
 
Figure 3.2 IJVs in each category with two parties or three or more parties
　As shown in Figure 3.2, we reviewed manufacturers and assemblers, 
and then, categorized it into Apparatus and Assembly Industries. The 
number of IJVs that belong to Assembly Industry is 185, while 115 belong 
to Apparatus Industry. Furthermore, approximately 60% of the IJVs have 
three or more partners, while approximately 40% have two partners. We 
found no specific difference between either. Among the combinations, 
Apparatus Industry and three or more partners are dominant.
 
 SDUWLHV RUPRUHSDUWLHV
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Figure 3.3 Apparatus and assembly industry
4. Pilot study 
　For our pilot study on IJVs in Thailand, we focused on IJVs established 
in 1987 specified in the Kaigai-Shinshutsu-Kigyo-Soran (Japanese 
Multinationals, Facts and Figures) 2016 edition. We selected the 1987 
edition because the definition of foreign companies became stable from this 
point onwards. It thus enables us to analyze the investment rate of IJVS.
　First, we analyzed investment rate as an indication of ownership of each 
IJV. We reviewed the overview of the data, and found that the number of 
IJVs is 16, with two and three or more partners. In case of three or more 
partners, we applied the investment rate of the leading company between 
them. We reviewed the 16 IJVs based on variation of investment rate, 
closure, and conversion to WOS after establishing them chronologically. As 
shown in Table 4.1, six IJVs holding minor investment rate became major 
holders. We then reviewed this data in detail. The under-50% investment 
rate of five IJVs increased from 95% to 100% from 1987 to 2015. The 
under-50% investment rate of one IJV increased from 50.1% to 94.9% from 
1987 to 2015. Similarly, five IJVs holding under 50% investment rate as 
of 1987 remained minor holders as of 2015. Two IJVs holding under 50% 
 $SSDUDWXV $VVHPEO\SDUWLHV RUPRUHSDUWLHV
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investment rate decreased their investment rate down to 0–5.0%. One IJV 
holding 50% investment rate remained in the same position as of 2015. Two 
IJVs holding 50.1–80% investment rate decreased their rate down to 0–5%.
Table 4.1 Variation of investment rate of IJV (from 1987 to 2015)
 
　Table 4.2 indicates variation of investment rate of 16 IJVs from 1987 
to 2015 more precisely. Ten IJVs out of 16 increased their investment 
rate, while six of them evolved from minor holders to major holders. This 
indicates that, in spite of beginning as minority holders in the investment 
rate, IJVs tend to gain more rate rather than their partners.
　Table 4.2 Variation of investment rate of IJV (from 1987 to 2015)
　Juhn (2000) pointed out in his research on Japanese-Korean IJVs that 
the maintenance factor of IJV drops drastically during 5–10 years after 
establishment. According to the paper, this indicates that IJVs’ mortality 
risk becomes the highest between five and 10 years after the IJV was 
established. We reviewed the data we applied. Table 4.3 indicates the 
variation of investment rate of IJVs between 1992 and 1997. Table 4.4 is 
2015
50%0-5.0% 5.1-49.9%
1987 0-49.9% 2 5 1 5
50.1-94.9% 95-100% Total
13
50% 1 1
50.1-80% 2 2
5 5 1Total 5 16
Variation of ownership Number of firms 
6 Minority to Majority 
Unchanged 1 
4 Minority (increase) 
3 Minority (decrease)
2 Majority to zero 
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the summary of Table 4.3. Eleven IJVs (minor investment holder) remained 
minor investment holders. Two IJVs became major investment rate holders 
from first being minor holders.
Table 4.3 Variation of investment rate of IJV (from 1992 to 1997)
 
Table 4.4 Variation of investment rate of IJV (from 1992 to 1997)
　We focused on IJVs whose investment rate did not change from 1992 
to 1997. Keeping continuity in mind, we investigated what happened to 
those IJVs later. Eleven IJVs did not change their investment rate. Six 
IJVs, among the 11, still exist as of 2015. Approximately 55% of IJVs did 
not change their investment rate as of 2015. On the other hand, five IJVs, 
whose investment rate changed from 1992 to 1997, did not exist as of 2015; 
they either left the local market or became WOS, thus terminating their 
partnership. We noted that the 5–10-year period after establishment was 
critical. If there is no change in the investment rate during this period, the 
IJV may continue even later. If the IJV partners would like to maintain the 
partnership with counterparts, they should survive the critical period.
0–5.0% 5.1–49.9% 50% 50.1–94.9%
From 1992 to 1997
95–100%
1987 0–5.0%
5.1–49.9% 11
Total
2 13
50% 1 1
50.1–94.9% 1 1
95–100% 1 1
1 11 1 3Total 16
Variation of ownership Number of firms 
5 Minority to Majority 
10 Unchanged (Minority) 
1 Unchanged (Even) 
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5. Conclusion 
　We investigated the variation of investment rate of IJVs in two different 
periods—from 1987 to 2015 covering all period, and the other period 
focusing only between 1992 and 1997—in order to review any variation 
and observe what happened in IJVs afterward. Although, the sample data 
was limited, we clarified that the 5–10-year period was a critical period for 
IJVs. As mentioned earlier, if there is any change in the investment rate 
of IJVs during this period, it may cause a mortality risk that triggers the 
termination of partnership. On the other hand, if there is no variation in 
the investment rate of IJVs, relatively more IJVs are able to survive and 
exist even later.
　As earlier specified, the continuity of IJVs is sometimes taken to be 
its honeymoon period. During the initial years, both partners put in the 
effort to establish a good partnership. However, during the 5–10 years 
after the honeymoon period, like the period of lassitude, variations in the 
partnership are caused easily. It thus becomes a critical period for both 
partners. Likewise, we presume that after passing the critical period, the 
survival rate of IJVs increases. In this research, we focused on the period 
from 5–10 years, but there may be another critical period for IJVs, such 
as a second honeymoon, period of lassitude, and so on. Furthermore, we 
understand that there may be variations depending on the basic year, 
which requires investigating other years’ data.
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Note
1) Trojan Horse Hypothesis-oriented (THH) partnership behavior of Japanese 
firms was tested by Ishii (2009) and Ishii and Hennart (2010). Some researchers 
do address that Japanese firms tend to end joint ventures shortly after learning 
effectively and efficiently from their Western partners.
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